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THE LIMITED POWER OF FEDERAL




A. The Policy Conflict
Over the course of the past few decades, public awareness of pri-
vately created environmental hazards has risen. As a result, state
and federal legislatures have been moved to enact comprehensive
environmental laws that serve both to remedy past harms and to
prevent future ones. Today, environmental statutes seek to correct
and prevent public health hazards as diverse as groundwater con-
tamination,1 toxic waste disposal,2 soil contamination,' destruction
of native plant and animal habitats,' and air pollution,' to name but
a few. In addition, state and federal courts have permitted the invo-
cation of common law theories, such as nuisance and trespass, to
allow recovery in tort for injuries sustained by plaintiffs subjected to
harmful environmental conditions.
6
Unfortunately, as laws creating environmental liabilities have
grown in scope and number, the cost of compliance has increased
enormously.7 For some business operators on the economic margin,
1. See, e.g., Water Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Water) Act. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act (commonly known as RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §3
6901-6992k (1988).
3. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
4. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7642 (1988), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7651-7671q (Supp. 1991).
6. See, e.g., Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.. 510 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 197i)
(plaintiffs allowed to bring tort action for interference with state-recognized "riparian
rights" where defendant had caused water pollution and thus impaired plaintiffs' use
and enjoyment of the stream bordering their property); Bagley v. Controlled Envtl.
Corp., 503 A.2d 823 (N.H. 1986) (contamination of plaintiffs soil and water caused by
adjacent landowner's unlawful release of chemicals actionable under negligence the-
ory); Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985) (plaintiffs
permitted to sue in trespass for damage to their property caused by airborne particles
from defendant's plant). See also Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollu-
tion Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L J 1126; Comment, Pri-
vate Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUht L REv 734 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Turner T. Smith, Jr., Interrelationship Between Bankruptcy Lou
and Environmental Law, 7 E MIN L INsr § 1.01, at 1-2 (1986), noting that
[clurrent estimates by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are
that cleanup costs under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) associ-
ated with the 1,800 hazardous waste sites presently scheduled for cleanup
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the substantial cost burdens associated with environmental compli-
ance and liability, in conjunction with other ambient economic pres-
sures, present an insurmountable barrier to profitable management.
As a result, these individuals may decide to seek protection from
their creditors, and from state and federal regulators, under the fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code ("Code").8
The tension generated when an environmental violator seeks ref-
uge from state regulators under the Code is the result of the con-
flicting policies which underlie the bankruptcy and environmental
laws. The Code, on the one hand, has as its primary purpose reliev-
ing "the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness
and [permitting] him to start afresh,"' and giving the bankrupt "a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, un-
hampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt"'0
while conserving the debtor's estate for the benefit of his creditors."
Environmental laws, on the other hand, seek to hold those very vio-
lators responsible, financially or otherwise, for the injuries they im-
pose on the public as a result of their violations, and to require
debtors to preserve and protect natural resources in the public do-
main; the long-term financial well-being of the business operator or
her creditors is a relatively minor concern. Courts charged with ad-
judicating such cases, then, "face a difficult policy conflict which pits
the concerns of environmental protection against the need to protect
the bankrupt and its creditors."' 2
Thus, when the environmental violator files a petition for bank-
ruptcy, "[c]onflict among the various parties is virtually assured."' 3
Government regulatory bodies want to see the debtor's assets used
to satisfy environmental liabilities or, in the alternative, to at least
enjoin the debtor's continuing violation of environmental laws.
total $16 billion, and Congress has passed CERCLA amendments that
could drive those costs up to $81 billion or higher. Costs at individual sites
can run from under one hundred thousand dollars to over $350 million.
(citations omitted).
8. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1989).
9. Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)
(interpreting the old Bankruptcy Act).
10. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
11. See In re McGoldrick, 121 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir.) (quoting In re Ostlind Mfg.
Co., 19 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Or. 1937)), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 675 (1941).
12. Douglas P. DeMoss, Note, The Bankruptcy Code and Hazardous Waste
Cleanup: An Examination of the Policy Conflict, 27 WM & MARY L REV 165, 166
(1985). See generally Arlene E. Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy
and Environmental Laws, 46 Bus. LAW. 626 (1991); Jonathan K. Van Patten & Rich-
ard D. Puetz, Bankruptcy and Environmental Obligations: The Clash Between Pri-
vate Relief and Public Policy, 35 S.D. L. REv. 220 (1990); Michael B. Guss, Comment,
Ohio v. Kovacs: The Conflict Between Federal Bankruptcy Laws and State Environ-
mental Regulations, 34 AM. U L. REv 1263 (1985).
13. Smith, supra note 7, § 1.02, at 1-4.
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These agencies believe that public health and safety concerns should
be placed well ahead of fiscal creditor interests in the bankruptcy
administration scheme, and that private parties should be forced to
bear, and not be permitted to avoid, the environmental costs they
impose on society. Creditors, on the other hand, want the bank-
ruptcy courts to insulate the debtor's estate from such environmen-
tal claims to the maximum extent possible so that their personal
interests in the estate are preserved. They also argue that if actions
initiated to enforce environmental laws are allowed to proceed
against a reorganizing debtor, the Code's equally important public
policy goals of permitting "a distressed business to continue operat-
ing, thereby providing jobs, products, and tax revenues"" and pro-
viding for "[e]fficient administration [which] gives the bankrupt the
greatest chance of successful rehabilitation,"' 1 will be defeated. A
further interest involved is that of the bankruptcy trustee, who will
want to minimize the complexity of the administration of the
debtor's assets and "avoid, at all costs, any personal liability for en-
vironmental violations during the bankruptcy process."'"
These competing interests present federal bankruptcy judges with
the task of resolving a conflict which was, as one commentator has
noted, only "dimly foreseen by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978. . .and, thus, not adequately provided for [in that
Act]." 1 Accordingly, the courts have been compelled to decide cases
which involve this policy conflict on what has been characterized as
an essentially "ad hoc basis.""
B. The Legal Issues
One of the questions that arises out of this conflict is whether a
state can force a Chapter 11 debtor to correct violations of state an-
tipollution laws, even though such an action would have the effect of
depleting assets which would otherwise be available to repay debts
owed to general creditors. I9 Stated in the alternative, the issue is
whether a federal bankruptcy court judge has the equitable author-
14. DeMoss, supra note 12, at 171.
15. Id.
16. Smith, supra note 7, § 1.02, at 1-4. Creditors may have similar concerns about
personal liability. In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 155U (11th Cir.
1990). the Eleventh Circuit held that secured creditors of a bankrupt estate may be
held liable for environmental clean-up costs under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988), if the creditor's involvement in the management of the debtor's operation
rises to a level such that the lender could have affected the debtor's waste manage-
ment decisions.
17. Smith, supra note 7, § 1.01, at 1-3.
18. DeMoss, supra note 12, at 175.
19. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources. Pa.. 733 F.2d
267, 269 (3d Cir. 1984).
19921
MAINE LAW REVIEW
ity to enjoin a state's enforcement of state environmental laws to
protect the interests of creditors. That is the precise issue which was
recently addressed by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maine in Wilner Wood Products Co. v. Maine Department
of Environmental Protection.20
Wilner Wood provides an excellent illustration of the clash be-
tween bankruptcy and environmental law. In that case, a company
which was ostensibly on the brink of financial collapse was asked by
a state regulatory agency to expend crucial funds to attain compli-
ance status under state air quality laws. Viewed from one angle, the
policies underlying the federal Bankruptcy Code might lead one to
conclude that the debtor should be permitted to forego compliance
temporarily while it focusses on reorganization and rehabilitative ef-
forts. Certainly it is at least arguable that such a policy would serve
the public economic interest by allowing the company to continue
its manufacturing and employment functions. On the other hand,
the policies behind state environmental regulations would seem to
lead to the conclusion that the debtor in possession should be re-
quired to comply with state law governing health and safety in an
ongoing fashion despite the financial burden compliance may cause,
and should not be permitted to use the Code to shield itself from
the same environmental responsibilities presently borne by the
debtor's solvent competitors.
Where is the middle ground? Should bankruptcy be permitted to
act as a shield for environmental wrongdoers? If the debtor has only
limited financial assets, how can it comply with state environmental
laws without placing its creditors at a serious disadvantage? With-
out compromising its own reorganization efforts? Is the preservation
of the debtor's estate to be given greater priority in the Code's ad-
ministrative scheme than the enforcement of state environmental
laws? Has the federal government effectively preempted the states'
environmental regulatory power through the Code? Was this a result
intended by Congress? While this Comment is of rather limited
scope and cannot address all of these issues adequately, the reader is
encouraged to bear these questions in mind as we venture a glimpse
at the rather extensive, and somewhat confusing, body of law that
survives at the bankruptcy-environmental interface.
C. A Case in Point: Wilner Wood Products Co.
Wilner Wood Products Company (Wilner Wood) owns and oper-
ates a wood products facility in Norway, Maine. Under Maine's anti-
pollution laws, operators like Wilner Wood are required to obtain
and hold a valid state air emissions license from the Maine Depart-
20. No. 90-0228-B (D. Me. May 10, 1991) (mem.).
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ment of Environmental Protection (DEP).21 Wilner Wood's emis-
sions license expired in late 1980, and on January 8, 1981, the com-
pany applied for license renewal in conformance with state
regulations. Under state law, the "expired" license remained valid
and in effect until such time as the DEP acted on the renewal
application.
2
Due to unexplained delays, the DEP did not address Wilner
Wood's application for renewal until 1989. When the application
was addressed, Wilner Wood and the DEP discussed the require-
ments for renewal and agreed that Wilner Wood would conduct and
submit a Best Practical Treatment (BPT) analysis2 3 within four
weeks of the February 12, 1990, notification date.2 ' Unfortunately,
Wilner Wood filed for Chapter 11 reorganization under the federal
Bankruptcy Code on February 9, 1990, and was unable to pay its
consultant to complete the mandated BPT analysis. As a result, the
company did not file the BPT analysis by the March 16, 1990, dead-
line and did not comply with any of the other requirements for a
new license. 5
On May 11, 1990, the DEP denied Wilner Wood's license renewal
application. Under Maine law, this denial had the effect of discon-
tinuing or revoking the old license, and took effect on May 15, 1990.
Wilner Wood appealed the DEP's denial of the renewal applica-
tion,26 and on the same day the federal bankruptcy court issued an
21. ME. REV. STAT ANN tit. 38, § 590 (West Supp. 1990-1991), provides in part:
After ambient air quality standards and emission standards have been
established within a region, the board [of Environmental Protection) may
by rule provide that no person may operate, maintain or modify in that
region any air contamination source or emit any air contaminants therein
without an emission license from the department (of Environmental
Protection].
The department shall have the authority to deny any air emission license
... when it determines that the source wilL not comply with the require-
ments imposed pursuant to the Federal Clean Air Act ....
22. Id.
23. Under Maine law, operators like Wilner Wood have to demonstrate that: tl1
the proposed emissions will be receiving the best practical treatment (BPT); (2) the
proposed emissions will not violate applicable air emissions standards; and (3) the
proposed emissions, either alone or in conjunction with existing emissions from other
sources, will not violate applicable ambient air quality standards. See Id.
24. It was not until February 12, 1990, that the DEP notified Wilner Wood of the
proper format of the BPT analysis. As a result, the analysis had not yet begun on
that date. Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection. No. 90-0228-
B, slip op. at 2 (D. Me. May 10. 1991) (mem.).
25. Id.
26. Wilner Wood appealed the DEP's denial of the renewal application on the
ground that the DEP acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it suddenly.
after ten years of regulatory inaction, demanded compliance with state air emissions
standards within 30 days of providing the format of the BPT analysis. Wilner Wood
Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection (In re Wilner Wood Prods. Co.) 119
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ex parte restraining order enjoining the State of Maine and the
Commissioner of Environmental Protection from acting on its denial
of the renewal application until Wilner Wood's appeal of the denial
was complete.2
7
On May 18, 1990, the parties appeared at a hearing before the
bankruptcy court to argue the validity of the issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction against the DEP.28 At oral argument, the State rep-
resented that it would not attempt to collect civil fines against the
debtor until entry of the judgment on administrative appeal,2" but
refused to assure the court that it would not then seek retroactive
penalties to May 15, 1990.30 The bankruptcy judge, expressing not a
little dismay over the DEP's sudden insistence on compliance after a
ten-year lapse of administrative attention, concluded that Wilner
Wood had met all the elements necessary for issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction pending an administrative appeal, 31 and invoked the
B.R. 345, 348 (Bankr. D. Me. 1990) [hereinafter Wilner Wood II].
27. Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, No. 90-0228.B,
slip op. at 2-3 (mem.).
28. Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection (In re Wilner
Wood Prods. Co.), 119 B.R. 342 (Bankr. D. Me. 1990) [hereinafter Wilner Wood I].
29. Id. at 345.
30. Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, No. 90-0228-B,
slip op. at 2-3.
31. Relying on FED. R. Civ. P. 65, the court noted that in order to obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction against the State, the debtor had to establish four elements: (1) the
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury to the movant; (3) the bal-
ance of equities favors relief; and (4) the public interest favors relief. Wilner Wood 1,
supra note 28, at 343 (citing Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697
(1st Cir. 1987); In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. 786 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987)).
With regard to the first element, the court noted that, even taking a narrow view of
this requirement, there was indeed evidence which indicated that the DEP had acted
arbitrarily in denying the renewal application and a likelihood that Wilner Wood
would succeed in the administrative appeal on that basis. As to the second element of
the test, the court concluded:
[I]f the effectiveness of the May 11, 1990 DEP order is not enjoined pend-
ing the debtor's appeal to the Maine Board of Environmental Protection,
irreparable harm will result. Without an injunction, the debtor will either
have to shut down operations and terminate the employment of one hun-
dred and fifty people, or continue to operate without a valid license, in clear
violation of state law. The record indicates that either course would proba-
bly lead to the early demise of this reorganization case, and result in liqui-
dation in Chapter 7. In these circumstances, the irreparable harm element
has been easily proved.
Wilner Wood II, supra note 26, at 347. The court also held that Wilner Wood had
met the other two elements of the test since the "State DEP's argument that an
injunction will interfere with its 'institutional policy' of administering its own laws
falls far short of the harm which will befall the debtor and its employees if the in-
junction is not issued," and because, in part, "the State's unexplained ten-year delay
makes a self-inflicted mockery out of the argument that any possible violation is of an
emergency nature." Id. at 348.
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court's perceived equitable powers under section 105 of the Code 2
to enjoin enforcement of the DEP's May 15, 1990, order.3
32. 11 U.S.C. § 105 provides:
(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is neces-
sary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be
construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or mak-
ing any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement
court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a court may not ap-
point a receiver in a case under this title.
(c) The ability of any district judge or other officer or emploNee of a
district court to exercise any of the authority or responsibilities conferred
upon the court under this title shall be determined by reference to the
provisions relating to such judge, officer, or employee set forth in title 28.
This subsection shall not be interpreted to exclude bankruptcy judges and
other officers or employees appointed pursuant to chapter 6 of title 28 from
its operation.
11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988) (emphases added).
33. The court concluded, after a brief review of three cases (In re Professional
Sales Corp., 56 B.R. 753 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1985), In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70
B.R. 786 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987); and Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989)), that § 105 "does indeed grant the Bankruptcy
Court the authority to enjoin the effectiveness of the DEP's May 1I, 1990 order,
pending the appeal." Wilner Wood II, supra note 26, at 349.
Once the court asserted this authority, it remained to be determined whether the
court should have invoked its perceived equitable powers under § 105 to enjoin the
DEP enforcement action. In addressing this question, the court referenced a nine-
part test formulated in In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. at 796-97, to aid it in
its exercise of equity jurisdiction. The court in Security Gas & Oil sugges ted that the
following factors be weighed when a bankruptcy court is trying to determine whether
or not the facts of a particular case warrant an injunction:
(1) The immediacy, severity, and certainty of the danger created by the
environmental hazard subject to the clean-up order.
(2) The extent to which debtor is uniquely able to effect the clean up;
(3) The extent to which creditor priorities would be distorted by enforce-
ment of the clean-up order;
(4) The effect of the enforcement order on the likelihood of a successful
reorganization, and whether a successful reorganization will substantially
increase the payoff to creditors and/or preserve jobs;
(5) How long the bankruptcy case has been open;
(6) How long the State has delayed in attempting to force debtor to clean
up the environmental hazard;
(7) The extent to which debtor continues to operate a similar business in
the State;
(8) The extent to which orders other than full prohibition of enforcement of
clean-up orders can better accommodate the State health and welfare con-
cerns with the policies of the Bankruptcy Code; and
(9) Any other considerations relevant to whether injunctive relief should be
granted, including the good or bad faith of the parties.
Wilner Wood I, supra note 28, at 343-44. After assessing these considerations, the
Wilner Wood I court determined that elements 1, 4, 5. 6, and 9 were controlling on
the facts of the case. Given that the DEP had delayed enforcement of its air emis-
sions standards against Wilner Wood for over 10 years, that the company was actively
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On appeal, the United States District Court for the District of
Maine vacated the bankruptcy court's order.3 4 The court reasoned
that 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), which requires the trustee of a reorganizing
estate to operate the debtor's property in accordance with state
law, 35 foreclosed the bankruptcy court's exercise of equity jurisdic-
tion in granting the section 105 "discretionary stay." Rejecting the
appellee's contention that a bankruptcy court has the power under
section 105 to enjoin any activity which would threaten the assets of
the debtor's estate, the court held that, under section 959(b),
"[t/here is no exception for debtors who would be inconvenienced or
burdened by State laws."38
While acknowledging the existence of authority to the contrary,
the court concluded that the "better-reasonea cases,"'37 in conjunc-
tion with the explicit language of section 959(b) and the "[v/ague
legislative history" 3 behind section 105, commanded reversal of the
bankruptcy court's order granting the debtor an injunction. In find-
ing the grant of the section 105 discretionary stay an illegitimate
exercise of power under section 959(b), the court held: "The bank-
ruptcy court cannot issue an injunction against the State that, even
on a temporary basis, [abrogates the State's exercise of police power
and] effectively grants [the debtor] a license. 39
II. ANATOMY OF THE CODE
A. The Automatic Stay: Legal Powers Under Section 362
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
working to comply with the DEP licensing requirements, that the company would be
forced to close if the injunction was not granted, and that the debtor's reorganization
effort was still quite young, the court decided to invoke its perceived § 105 powers
and enjoin the state police power action. Id. at 344. The court held that, as a matter
of policy, the debtor's "positive efforts should not be frustrated and/or wasted be-
cause of the DEP's sudden insistence on shutting down the business of the debtor,
after a decade of bureaucratic inattention," and that "enforcement of the DEP Order,
at this time, will, without doubt, unduly and unnecessarily interfere with Bank-
ruptcy adjudication and administration of this case. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, No. 90-0228-B,
slip op. at 8 (D. Me. May 10, 1991) (mem.).
35. Section 959(b) provides:
[A] trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any
court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage
and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or man-
ager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which
such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor
thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
36. Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, No. 90-0228-B,
slip op. at 4.
37. Id. at 6-7 n.3.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 4-5.
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§ 362(a),40 generally operates to prevent interference with the
debtor's property upon the filing of a petition for bankruptcy by
prohibiting commencement or continuation of a judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding against the debtor that could have been initiated
pre-petition, or recovery on a pre-petition claim." The stay's scope
is broad'2 and is recognized as "one of the fundamental debtor pro-
40. Section 362(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate.
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor
and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
41. Only pre-petition claims are at issue in bankruptcy cases since debts which
arise post-petition are not subject to discharge under the Code. See, e.g.. In re Jen-
sen, 114 B.R. 700, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
42. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5836; HRI REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 340 (1977). re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6297 ("The scope of [section 362(a)] is broad. All
proceedings are stayed, including arbitration. . . administrative, and judicial pro-
ceedings. Proceeding in this sense encompasses civil actions as well, and all proceed-
ings even if they are not before government tribunals."). See also 2 WILLIAl M COL-
LIER. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.04, at 362-32 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds.. 15th
ed. 1991) [hereinafter 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ("The stay of section 362 is ex-
tremely broad in scope and . . . should apply to almost any type of formal or infor-
mal action against the debtor or property of the estate.").
Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(15) (West 1991), the term "entity" is broadly defined to
include any "person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee." It
has been described as "the most inclusive of the various terms relating to bodies or
units." Additionally, the term "claim" refers broadly to the
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
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tections provided by the bankruptcy laws." '43 Its primary purpose is
to provide the debtor with a "breathing spell" and to "replace an
unfair race to the courthouse with an orderly liquidation procedure
designed to treat all creditors equally."" Unquestionably, actions in-
itiated by states to enforce their environmental laws, such as the
DEP enforcement action in Wilner Wood, fall within the scope of
this section .4
However, the application of the automatic stay is further gov-
erned by the express exceptions Congress has enumerated in section
362(b). For instance, under subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5) the auto-
matic stay provision will not operate against state or federal agen-
cies seeking to enforce their police powers in a good faith,40 non-
discriminatory manner, 17 unless such agencies are seeking to enforce
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dis-
puted, undisputed, secured or unsecured;
11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West Supp. 1991).
43. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840-41; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6296-97. "[Section 362] stops all collection ef-
forts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a
repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures
that drove him into bankruptcy."
44. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988). See also In re
Kish, 41 B.R. 620, 624 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) ("The primary purpose of § 362 is to
prevent the piecemeal liquidation of a debtor company by the piranha-like attacks of
creditors."); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5835; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1977), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6297 ("Without [section 362],. . . [creditors] who
acted first would obtain payment of [their] claims in preference to and to the detri-
ment of other creditors.").
45. See In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection
Agency, 805 F.2d 1175, 1186 (5th Cir. 1986) (an attempt to bring a Chapter 11 debtor
"into compliance with state and federal environmental laws. . . 'falls squarely within
the [government's] police and regulatory powers [and hence is subject to the provi-
sions of § 362]. . . . No more obvious exercise of the [government's power to protect
the health, safety and welfare of the public can be imagined.' ") (citing Penn Terra
Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, Pa., 733 F.2d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 1984)).
46. See In re Beker Indus. Corp., 57 B.R. 611, 627 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (section
362(b) exceptions apply only when states act in good faith to enforce their police
powers).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1988) (Protection against discriminatory treatment) provides,
in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act
* . . a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew
a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to . . . a person
that is or has been a debtor under this title . . . solely because such bank-
rupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or
debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commence-
ment of the case under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is
[Vol. 44:485
BANKRUPTCY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
a previously obtained "money judgment."'4 Thus, in order to deter-
mine whether the automatic stay applies in a given case, one must
address two central questions: (1) Whether the state's actions qual-
ify as a good faith exercise of its "police or regulatory" powers, and,
if so, (2) Whether the state's actions are in substance merely an ef-
fort to enforce a money judgment.
1. The Police Power Exception to the Automatic Stay
The exceptions listed in section 362(b)(4) relate only to those ac-
tions which would otherwise be automatically stayed under section
362(a)(1). The legislative history of this subsection makes clear Con-
gress' intention to except from the automatic stay proceedings initi-
ated by a governmental unit to protect public health and safety, and
to include in the exception, at the very minimum, at least some
types of environmental enforcement actions:
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions
and proceedings by governmental units to enforce police or regula-
tory powers. Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, con-
sumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or at-
tempting to fix damages for violation of such law, the action or pro-
ceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.'9
However, while the term "police or regulatory power" is quite
granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable
in the case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy
Act.
For example, in In re Professional Sales Corp., 56 B.R. 753 (N.D. I1. 1985), the court
stated that a government agency cannot revoke a license or permit solely because the
debtor is insolvent or has not paid a dischargeable debt, but can revoke if some other
alternate non-financial explanation is given (e.g., debtor has committed a statutory
violation of the permit conditions, debtor's ongoing licensed activities pose a danger
to the public health and safety, etc.). Id. at 760 n.4. See also In re Rath Packing Co..
35 B.R_ 615, 619 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (noting various interpretations of the
phrase "solely because" in the context of § 525).
48. Section 362(b) of the Code provides, in pertinent part:
The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ...
does not operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or con-
tinuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police or regulatory power,
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judg-
ment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding
by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regu-
latory power;
11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
49. & REP No 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838 (emphasis added); H R REP No 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
343 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. 6299 (emphasis added).
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broad,50 this section stops short of granting states unlimited discre-
tion to bring actions against reorganizing debtors under any and all
circumstances. Rather, the exception is to be "construed to apply to
the enforcement of state laws affecting health, welfare, morals and
safety, but not to 'regulatory laws that directly conflict with the con-
trol of the res or property [of the estate] by the bankruptcy
court.' "51 Moreover, the exception does not apply to actions initi-
ated by a governmental unit merely to protect its pecuniary interest
in property of the debtor or estate.52
Still, while some environmental enforcement actions may be
rightly characterized as pecuniary in nature (e.g., bringing suit
against a debtor to fix liability for environmental violations), there is
little indication that this "exception to the exception" is anything
like a panacea for environmental debtors. The great weight of au-
thority recognizes that such actions, while facially pecuniary, also
have a deterrent function and hence serve a legitimate non-pecuni-
ary state interest. Thus, anytime a non-pecuniary state interest is
served by bringing an enforcement action, even where such is inexo-
rably tied to a concurrent pecuniary interest, the action will be per-
mitted to proceed under subsection 362(b)(4).5 3
50. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, Pa., 733 F.2d 267,
273 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Congress intentionally used such a broad term as 'police and
regulatory powers' ... and no unnatural efforts [should] be made to limit its
scope.").
51. In re Cash Currency Exch., Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 555 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added). See Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the E.D. of Ark., 647
F.2d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); see infra notes 72-88
and accompanying text.
52. The "pecuniary interest" rule is derived from an excerpt contained in the leg-
islative history of § 362(b)(4):
This section is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to per-
mit governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and
safety and not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecu-
niary interest in property of the debtor or property of the estate.
124 CONG. REC. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505,
6513 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (emphasis added); 124 CONG. REc. H11089 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6444-6445 (statement of
Rep. Edwards) (emphasis added).
Under this rule, "reviewing courts must distinguish between proceedings that adju-
dicate private rights [of the state] and those that effectuate public policy." In re
Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 1988). While a government entity will
be permitted to enforce laws against the debtor which serve the public health, wel-
fare, safety, and morals, it does not have "standing" to sue a debtor to protect its
pecuniary interests under § 362(b)(4). See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R.
540, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court for
the E.D. of Ark., 647 F.2d at 776 (holding that state statutes which are pecuniary in
nature, and which do not relate primarily to matters of public safety and health, do
not fall within the § 362(b)(4) exception).
53. The judicial rule that has evolved from the legislative history of § 362(b)(4),
see supra note 52, is that a state enforcement action will always be excepted from the
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In fact, there is little hope that a debtor faced with an environ-
mental enforcement action will be able to avoid the expense associ-
ated with appearing in an administrative tribunal by challenging the
action under the pecuniary interest rule.5 ' The legislative history
provides some anecdotal evidence which suggests that the 1973 ver-
sion of section 362 was specifically revised in the current Act to pre-
clude an interpretation of that section which would allow a debtor to
shield itself from proceedings initiated by a state to enforce its anti-
pollution laws. Speaking in regard to the proposed 1978 revision
(which was later adopted as law), the House Report noted:
The new stay expands coverage in some areas, reduces it in others,
and clarifies many uncertain aspects of the current [19731
provisions.
Under present [1973] law, there has been some overuse of the
stay in the area of governmental regulation. For example, in one
Texas bankruptcy court, the stay was applied to prevent the State
of Maine from closing down one of the debtor's plants that was
polluting a Maine river in violation of Maine's environmental pro-
tection laws. In a Montana case, the stay was applied to prevent
Nevada from obtaining an injunction against a principal in a corpo-
ration who was acting in violation of Nevada's anti-fraud consumer
protection laws. The [present] bill excepts these kinds of actions
from the automatic stay. The States will be able to enforce their
police and regulatory powers free from the automatic stay.5
Perhaps reflecting the clarity of the legislative history, courts seem
to be in accord on this point: the enforcement of state and federal
environmental laws "falls squarely within the § 362(b)(4) police and
regulatory exception to the automatic stay. '5 6 Indeed, at least one
automatic stay unless it is brought solely to protect the state's pecuniary interest.
See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. at 540; United States v. Nicolet,
Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Commerce Oil Co.. 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir.
1988); United States v. Mattiace Indus., 73 B.R. 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); United States
v. Standard Metals Corp., 49 B.R. 623 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Energy Int'l,
Inc., 19 B.R. 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Lenz Oil Serv., 65 B.R. 292 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986).
54. This, of course, does not preclude evasive action under §§ 362(b)(5) or 105.
See discussion infra parts II.A.2 and II.B.
55. HEARINGS ON H.R 31 AND HR 32 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM ON CIVIL AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., Ist and 2d Sess.
166, (1975-76) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6127, 6135 (statement of David H.
Williams, Federal Trade Commission) (footnotes omitted) (citing H.R. 8200 § 101
(proposed 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4))).
56. In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency.
805 F.2d 1175, 1186 (5th Cir. 1986). See also United States v. Nicolet, Inc.. 857 F.2d
202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that the § 362(b) exceptions were fashioned "[to] com-
bat the risk that the bankruptcy court would become a sanctuary for environmental
wrongdoers .... ); In re Commerce Oil Co.. 847 F.2d 291, 296 (6th Cir. 1988)
("Punishing wrongdoers, deterring illegal activity, [and] recovering remedial costs of
damage to the environment ... are exercises of the state's regulatory power... and
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court has noted that "[n]one of the cases that have applied the pe-
cuniary interest rule in holding section 362(b)(4) inapplicable have
involved . ..environmental legislation. 57
2. The Money Judgment Exception to the Automatic Stay
Concluding that a state action has been taken in furtherance of a
state's police and regulatory powers is only the first step in the anal-
ysis of the automatic stay provision. Subsection 362(b)(5) further
provides an "exception to the exception" to the extent that actions
brought to enforce money judgments are affected by the automatic
stay even if such actions were brought pursuant to the government's
police and regulatory powers. 8 Under this provision, the entry of a
money judgment is permitted (so long as such an action passes mus-
ter under the 362(b)(4) exception), but the enforcement of a money
judgment is not.59 The legislative history provides insight into the
are not actions based upon the state's [pecuniary] property interests."); In re
Norwesco Dev. Co., 68 B.R. 123, 128 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) ("The police powers
inherent in environmental protection laws are excepted from the automatic stay
. ... ); United States v. Standard Metals Corp., 49 B.R. at 625 (the express purpose
of § 362(b)(4) is to prevent "endangerment of the public that would result from per-
mitting a bankrupt to avoid statutes and regulations enacted in furtherance of gov-
ernmental police powers"); In re Williston Oil, 54 B.R. at 12 (the state's police power
"necessarily includes the state's attempts to force debtors to rectify harmful environ-
mental hazards").
57. United States v. Mattiace Indus., 73 B.R. 816, 819 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
58. Section 362(b)(5) of the Code provides:
The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title .
does not operate as a stay-
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judg-
ment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding
by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regu-
latory power ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988) (emphasis added). The corollary of this provision is, of
course, that enforcement proceedings initiated by governmental units which seek in-
junctive relief are not stayed under §§ 362(a) or 362(b)(4)-(5). See, e.g., SEC v. First
Fin. Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429, 437 (5th Cir. 1981).
59. See, e.g., In re Lenz Oil Serv., 65 B.R. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986):
"The distinction between entry and enforcement of a money judgment is
clear. The first is free of the automatic stay; the second is stayed. Congress
allows governmental units to get money judgments in pursuit of their police
power, but forces them to wait in line like all other creditors to get the
judgment enforced."
Id. at 295 (quoting Illinois v. Electrical Utils., 41 B.R. 874, 877 (N.D. Ill. 1984)). See
also United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207, 209 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Com-
monwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1183 (5th Cir. 1986); City of New York v.
Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. F.E. Gregory &
Sons, Inc.. 58 B.R. 590, 592 (W.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Standard Metals Corp.,
49 B.R. 623, 625 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Ilco, Inc., 48 B.R. 1016, 1024 (N.D.
Ala. 1985); United States v. Energy Int'l, Inc., 19 B.R. 1020, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1981); In
re Williston Oil Corp., 54 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1984).
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operation and policy behind this provision:
Paragraph (5) makes clear that the exception extends to permit an
injunction and enforcement of an injunction, and to permit the en-
try of a money judgment, but does not extend to permit enforce-
ment of a money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor are in
the possession and control of the bankruptcy court, and since they
constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share,
enforcement by a governmental unit of a money judgment would
give it preferential treatment to the detriment of all other
creditors.6 0
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a definition of the term
"enforcement of a money judgment" and, as a result, this exception
has generated a great deal of litigation. Debtors, on the one hand,
have persistently argued that any time a government unit seeks to o
compel a reorganizing debtor to take action which will require an
expenditure of money, the proceeding is, in effect, one which seeks
the "enforcement of a money judgment." Government regulatory
agencies, on the other hand, contend that an enforcement action
should be considered one seeking "the enforcement of a money judg-
ment" only if the judgment rendered would contain a definite and
certain statement of the amount owed.
The prevalent view on this issue was adeptly expressed by the
Third Circuit in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental
Resources, Pennsylvania." In that case the court noted that where
Congress has failed to provide a legislative definition of a statutory
term, the meaning must be "gleaned from the commonly accepted
usage and from whatever indications of congressional intent we find
persuasive."62 Then, after turning to an analysis of tradition and le-
gal custom, the court explained:
In common understanding, a money judgment is an order en-
tered by the court or by the clerk, after a verdict has been rendered
for [the] plaintiff, which adjudges that the defendant shall pay a
sum of money to the plaintiff. Essentially, it need consist of only
two elements: (1) an identification of the parties for and against
whom judgment is being entered, and (2) a definite and certain
designation of the amount which plaintiff is owed by the
defendant.
The paradigm for . . .a proceeding [to enforce a money judg-
ment] is when, having obtained a judgment for a sum certain, a
plaintiff attempts to seize property of the defendant in order to
satisfy that judgment. It is this seizure ... which is proscribed by
60. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, (1978) reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838 (emphasis added); H R REP No 95-595. 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
343 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6299 (emphasis added).
61. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 274-75.
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subsection 362(b)(5).6 3
The court went on to note that one important factor to keep in
mind in determining whether an action is indeed one "to enforce a
money judgment" is whether the claim asserted seeks compensation
for past damages or protection against future harms; a proceeding
which is initiated to compensate for past harms will generally be one
which seeks enforcement of a money judgment, while an action in-
stituted to enjoin present or future wrongful acts will not.6 4 The
Penn Terra approach has been adopted by the great majority of
courts addressing the interpretation of this provision."
Against this backdrop stands a single case which, in dicta, seems
to accept the proposition that a state court judgment which requires
a debtor to take action which will require an expenditure of money
is, in fact, an action "to enforce a money judgment.""6 In a rather
confusing opinion, the court in In re Thomas Solvent Co. apparently
63. Id. at 275 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 276-77.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077,
1086-89 (3d Cir. 1987) (consent decree requiring debtor to install pollution control
equipment not stayed under the "money judgment" exception since order sought to
prevent future harm); In re Commonwealth Oil Ref., 805 F.2d 1175, 1186-88 (5th Cir.
1986) (the incidental expense which a debtor will incur to comply with environmental
laws does not convert an action into an enforcement of a money judgment); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (an injunctive order to remedy a
situation resulting from pre-petition conduct is not a "money judgment" simply be-
cause it requires the debtor to expend money); United States v. Ilco, Inc., 48 B.R.
1016, 1024 (D.D.C. 1985) (order requiring debtor to perform cleanup in compliance
with federal clean water and hazardous waste statutes not a "money judgment" since
the order merely seeks to protect State's citizens from future harm); In re Torwico
Elects., Inc., 131 B.R. 561, 572 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (obligations to clean up pre-
petition environmental contamination should generally be defined as "money judg-
ments"); In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. 786, 790-91 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987)
(court action requiring debtor to reclaim abandoned oil wells not a "money judg-
ment" since action did not seek monetary sum for compensation, but rather was in-
tended to prevent future harm); In re Norwesco Dev. Co., 68 B.R. 123, 129 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1986) (an action is one to enforce a money judgment only if it sounds com-
pensatory rather than preventive, or "sounds in restitution"); United States v. F.E.
Gregory & Sons, Inc., 58 B.R. 590, 591-93 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (order requiring
debtor to reclaim an abandoned mine site not a "money judgment" since the purpose
of the order was to prevent future environmental harm and the order did not require
payment of a sum certain); In re Laurinburg Oil Co., 49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D.
N.C. 1984) (State's action seeking to compel debtor to abate violations of state water
pollution laws not stayed under the "money judgment" exception).
See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 42, 362.05, at 362-48, noting that:
By far the greatest amount of judicial activity under section 362(b)(4) has
to do with the enforcement of environmental laws. Most courts have con-
cluded that section 362(b)(4) will permit a governmental unit to fix civil
liability and to enforce present compliance with environmental laws, even
where an expenditure of funds may be necessary as long as no attempt is
made to collect on a judgment based upon past violations.
66. See In re Thomas Solvent Co., 44 B.R. 83 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984).
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misapplied the holding of the Sixth Circuit in In re Kovacs (Kovacs
11)67 and, after asserting that subsection 362(b)(5) was not directly
at issue, indicated that a state court judgment requiring the debtor
to take action to correct ongoing environmental hazards at an esti-
mated cost of over two and one-half million dollars could be stayed
as an action to enforce a money judgment.
While the court's opinion in Thomas Solvent represents a lone
voice in the wilderness, at least one facet of the court's rationale
does have some instinctive appeal. After taking note of the policy
language in the legislative history of subsection 362(b)(5) to the ef-
fect that a governmental unit should not be permitted to extract
funds from the debtor's estate to the detriment of all other credi-
tors, 8 the court reasoned that a governmental unit should not be
permitted to enforce actions which would have the effect of deplet-
ing the funds of the estate. Such a policy, the court noted, would
discourage potential trustees from becoming involved in administra-
tion of the estate (for fear they would not be compensated for the
costs and expenses incurred throughout administration) and would
thus threaten the effective liquidation and/or administration of the
estate. 9
However, such an interpretation appears to be logically foreclosed
by the operation of the Code. As the Third Circuit noted in Penn
Terra, nearly every granted state request for injunctive relief to
compel performance will cost the defendant something. Thus, a
broad definition of "money judgment" like that suggested in
Thomas Solvent (i.e., "any order which requires the expenditure of
money") would narrow the exception for government police action
under subsection 362(b)(5) "into virtual nonexistence."1 0 Since such
an interpretation is at odds with the plain meaning of subsection
362(b)(5) and would have the effect of preempting a state's author-
ity to protect public health and safety via the police powers, it may
not stand.7 1
67. 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), a/i'd, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). In Kovacs II, the State
admitted that its claim was compensatory in nature and that the only way the debtor
could satisfy the judgment was through the payment of a sum certain. Id. By con-
trast, the State in Thomas Solvent was seeking to prevent a future harm by getting
an injunction which would have required the mere expenditure of money. Under the
Penn Terra analysis, the action in Kovacs II would clearly quality as one seeking the
"enforcement of a money judgment," while the action in Thomas Solvent would not.
See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
68. See supra text accompanying note 61.
69. In re Thomas Solvent Co., 44 B.R. at 88.
70. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, Pa., 733 F.2d 267, 277-78
(3d Cir. 1984).
71. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311
(1981) (preemption must either be explicit, or compelled due to an unavoidable con-
flict between state and federal law); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (pre-
emption analysis begins with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to
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3. Automatic Stay of Acts to Obtain Property of the Estate
If a state environmental enforcement action qualifies as an exer-
cise of the state's police power, and is not initiated to enforce a
money judgment against the debtor's estate7 2 there remains one
question which still must be addressed under section 362 to deter-
mine whether the state may go forward with an enforcement pro-
ceeding against a reorganizing debtor. Under subsection 362(a)(3),
the state may not bring any suit against the debtor which consti-
tutes an "act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . .-.
Since the subsection (b) exceptions to the automatic stay do not ap-
ply to subsection 362(a)(3),7 4 even a state suit filed pursuant to en-
forcement of its police powers through non-monetary judgment
means is stayed if the enforcement qualifies as an action to obtain or
control property of the estate.
This section is most often cited in the environmental context by
debtors who seek to stay revocation of a state-issued operating li-
cense or permit. The bankrupt typically argues that the license rep-
resents a property right, and that such an interest clearly falls
within the broad definition of "property of the estate" under section
541 of the Code.75 Revocation, it is contended, is an "act to obtain
property of the estate," and is stayed as such under subsection
362(a)(3). State administrative agencies, on the other hand, argue
that state-issued regulatory licenses and permits are not "property
of the estate" in the conventional sense, and so revocation actions
are not stayed under that subsection. Furthermore, the agencies ar-
displace state law).
72. See discussion supra parts II.A.1 and II.A.2.
73. For the full text of this provision, see supra note 40.
74. See supra note 48.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 541 provides in part:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following prop-
erty, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this sec-
tion, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case.
(b) Property of the estate does not include-
(1) any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the bene-
fit of an entity other than the debtor; or
(2) any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of non-
residential real property . . . ; or
(3) any eligibility of the debtor to participate in programs au-
thorized under the Higher Education Act of 1965 . . ..
(c)(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in
a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforce-
able in a case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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gue that even if licenses are to be brought within the definition of
"estate property," state revocation of such licenses cannot properly
be characterized as an action to "obtain or control" such "property."
Though the rationale varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most
courts are in agreement that license revocation proceedings are in-
deed not acts to obtain control or possession of a debtor's prop-
erty.76 For instance, in expressing the narrower view of the majority
position, the court in In re Professional Sales Corp.77 noted in dicta
that the Environmental Protection Agency's termination of the
debtor's "interim status" under the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act"8 was not stayed under subsection 362(a)(3) because the
revocation of such a permit or privilege did not involve the taking of
"tangible property" from the debtor. 79 The court noted that the ter-
mination "in no way interfere[d] with the bankruptcy court's exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the debtor's property,"8 " and did not consider
"plausible" the argument that subsection 362(a)(3) would operate to
stay the agency action.8
1
However, the great majority of courts that have addressed this is-
sue have employed a somewhat different approach. These courts
concede, as it seems they logically must, that licenses and permits
do qualify as "property" under the broad definition provided in sec-
tion 541,82 but they do not apply subsection 362(a)(3) to license rev-
ocations because acting to deny or revoke a license, permit, or other
76. 56 B.R. 753 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1985).
77. Id.
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
79. In re Professional Sales Corp., 56 B.R. at 764. However, note that neither
§ 541 nor the legislative history of the Code restricts the definition of property to
"tangible" interests. In fact, a statement appended to the House report specifically
noted that "property of the estate" includes "all interests, such as interests in real or
personal property, tangible and intangible property, choses in action, causes of ac-
tion, rights such as copyrights, trade-marks, patents, and processes, contingent inter-
ests and future interests ...." HEARINGS ON H R 31 AND H R 32 BEoR TIlE SUa-
COMM ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM ON THE JUDICIARY.
94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 175 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6127. 6136
(statement of David H. Williams, Attorney. Federal Trade Commission) (emphasis
added). Such a broad definition would seem to foreclose the conclusion that the very
real interest one has in public licenses and permits is not included in the term "prop-
erty of the estate."
80. In re Professional Sales Corp., 56 B.R. at 764.
81. Id. at 763 n.6.
82. See In re Scott Hous. Sys., Inc., 91 B.R. 190 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988) (the term
"property of the estate" is broad and includes all legal and equitable interests of the
debtor in property; nonconforming use privileges fall within that definition); In re
Beker Indus. Corp., 57 B.R. 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (order allowing debtor to
utilize certain roads in his mining operation was a "license," and hence "property of
the estate" within the meaning of the Code); In re Kish, 41 B.R. 620 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1984) (trustee's position that a public license is included within the broad defi-
nition of "property of the estate" was correct); In re Mason, 18 B.R. 817 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1982) (state liquor license is a "substantial asset" of the debtor's estate).
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privilege does not constitute an act to "obtain possession of or con-
trol" such property. These courts distinguish between acts to "ob-
tain property of the estate" (which are stayed) and acts which
merely seek to "deprive the estate of property" (which do not fall
within the scope of subsection 362(a)(3)). In In re Kish,83 for exam-
ple, the court examined the plain meaning of the terms in subsec-
tion 362(a)(3) and held:
The word "obtain", for the purposes of § 362, includes within it
not only the loss of the interest by the estate, but the acquisition of
that interest by the interested party. If Congress had intended
[that public license revocation would fall within the § 362(a)(3)
stay], it would have used the words "deprive the estate of" in place
of the word "obtain".
84
Thus, since the state does not initiate a revocation proceeding to
convert a license, permit, or other privilege to its own use, the action
cannot be properly characterized as one to "obtain" the debtor's
property.8"
Courts that have expressed this view also note that environmental
licenses and permits are readily distinguishable from the types of
interests that are protected under subsection 362(a)(3) in that the
"property right" in such licenses is expressly conditioned upon com-
pliance with statutory requirements and is recognized as fully defea-
sible. Since noncompliance with the conditions extinguishes the
property interest, the debtor has no right to claim a continuing
property interest in the license after violation of the conditions oc-
curs, or to assert that a formal action taken by a government unit to
withdraw permit privileges constitutes a "threat to the debtor's as-
sets." What government regulation giveth, it may taketh away, and
the bankruptcy court hath no power to restore. 8
83. In re Kish, 41 B.R. 620 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
84. Id. at 623.
85. The legislative history seems to support this interpretation. Both the Senate
and House reports indicate that the purpose behind § 362(a)(3) "is to prevent dis-
memberment of the estate" and to allow "liquidation [to] proceed in an orderly fash-
ion." S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5836; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 341 (1978), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6298. This might be interpreted to indicate that
§ 362(a)(3) was intended to encompass only actions to obtain liquefiable or transfer-
rable property interests of the estate. Since environmental licenses and permits are
generally not liquidated or transferred, proceedings initiated to revoke these property
interests would fall outside the scope of § 362(a)(3).
86. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc., (In re Braniff Air-
ways) 700 F.2d 935, 942 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that "whatever vitality the 'threat
to assets' theory may have, it is inapplicable where . . . the very existence of the
,asset' depends on the regulatory activity in question"); In re Professional Sales
Corp., 56 B.R. 753, 764 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (noting that the bankruptcy court does
not have the power to expand the license privileges of a debtor beyond what they
would be outside bankruptcy).
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Still, it is not impossible for a debtor to prevail on the theory that
revocation of a license is stayed under subsection 362(a)(3). A few
courts have held that the revocation by a governmental unit of cer-
tain types of privileges is indeed stayed under this subsection. For
instance, in In re Scott Housing Systems, Inc.,"7 the bankruptcy
court held that the enforcement of a zoning classification change,
which was triggered by the passage of time, was stayed under sub-
section 362(a)(3).8 The court reasoned that the change, which had
the effect of "revoking" the old zoning classification of the debtor's
land, was "clearly an act which limit[ed] or regulate[d] the debtor's
use of the land," and had the "potential of adversely affecting [its]
• . .value," and so qualified as an "act. . . to exercise control over
property of the estate."8
Moreover, the legislative history of this provision is somewhat am-
biguous. The House Report on subsection 362(a) indicates that,
under this provision, "[all proceedings are stayed, including arbi-
tration, license revocation, administrative, and judicial proceed-
ings." 90 Thus, while it is certainly the minority view, one might suc-
cessfully argue that a license revocation which has the effect of
adversely affecting the value of the debtor's collateral property, or
limiting the use of such property, should be stayed under this
section.9 1
B. The Discretionary Stay: Equitable Powers Under Section 105
1. Interaction of Sections 362 and 105
Under section 105 of the Code, federal bankruptcy courts are em-
powered to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of" the Code02 While
most authorities recognize that section 105 operates to confer rather
broad equitable powers on these courts, there is some dispute over
the precise scope of this power. Along the environmental-bank-
ruptcy interface, for instance, an oft-posed question is whether a
federal bankruptcy court may enlist its equitable powers under sec-
87. In re Scott Hous. Sys., Inc., 91 B.R. at 195.
88. H.R. REP No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6297 (emphasis added). An equivalent of the term "license revo.
cation" does not appear in the corresponding Senate Report, perhaps indicating that
there existed some disagreement over the scope of the § 362(a)(31 stay in this area.
89. Id. at 194-95.
90. See supra note 88.
91. See, e.g., In re Wengert Transp., Inc., 59 B.R. 226. 231 n. 2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1986) (noting that a debtor may be able to obtain a stay under § 362(a)(3) where a
state initiates an action to revoke a permanent operating certificate). Cf. In re Gen-
carelli, 14 B.R. 751, 753 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981) (indicating that license revocation pro-
ceedings may be stayed under § 362(a)(1) only if the proceedings would not somehow
serve to protect the health and safety of the public).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988). See supra note 32.
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tion 105 to stay enforcement of a state's environmental laws, even
where the section 362 automatic stay is inapplicable.9
3
The vast majority of courts have held that section 105 does indeed
confer upon bankruptcy courts the power to issue equitable stays in
situations where section 362 does not apply.94 These courts recognize
that section 105, derived from the broadly-worded All Writs Stat-
ute9 58 and expanded in scope from its predecessor in the former
Bankruptcy Act,98 was meant to confer ample equitable powers.
This view is supported by the legislative history of section 105,
which indicates that neither subsection 362(a), nor the exceptions
listed under subsection 362(b), operate to limit the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court or its power to issue injunctions:
The effect of [a subsection 362(b)] exception is not to make the
action immune from injunction. The [bankruptcy] court has ample
other powers to stay actions not covered by the automatic stay.
Section 105 ... grants the power to issue orders necessary or ap-
propriate to carry out the provisions of title 11. The . . . bank-
ruptcy court . . . [has] all the traditional injunctive powers of a
court of equity . . . . Stays or injunctions issued under . . . [sec-
tion 105] will not be automatic upon the commencement of the
case, but will be granted or issued under the usual rules for the
issuance of injunctions. By excepting an act or action from the au-
tomatic stay, the bill simply requires that the trustee move the
court into action, rather than requiring the stayed party to request
93. An example of this situation is when the state is taking an action pursuant to
an exercise of its police powers, and is not seeking "enforcement of a money judg-
ment" or seizure of estate property. See discussion supra part II.
94. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, Pa., 733 F.2d
267 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. 786 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1987); In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Metro
Transp. Co., 64 B.R. 968 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Norwesco Dev. Corp., 68 B.R.
123 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 57 B.R. 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986); In re Professional Sales Corp., 56 B.R. 753 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Willis-
ton Oil Corp., 54 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984); In re Thomas Solvent Co., 44 B.R. 83
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984); In re Mason, 18 B.R. 817 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982). See
also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 42, 105.04, at 105-17 (court may use
§ 105 to enjoin acts which would otherwise be excepted from § 362 if"it determines
that the acts would interfere with the bankruptcy case or if equity or substantial
justice would require it.").
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988) provides in part: "(a) The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
96. Section 2(a)(15) of the prior Act empowered the bankruptcy courts to issue
only such orders, process, and judgments as were necessary for enforcement of the
Code's provisions, and denied these courts the authority to enjoin or restrain another
court. See 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15) (repealed 1979). Section 105 of the current Act per-
mits bankruptcy courts to issue any orders, processes, or judgments which are neces-
sary or appropriate to the enforcement of the Code's provisions, and contains no
restriction on the courts' power to equitably enjoin the actions of other courts. 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
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relief from the stay. There are some actions, enumerated in the
[362(b)] exceptions, that generally should not be stayed automati-
cally upon the commencement of the case, for reasons of either pol-
icy or practicality. Thus, the court will have to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether a particular action which may be harm-
ing the estate should be stayed.97
Thus, the express purpose behind the section 105 provision is to
provide additional protection to the debtor which would not other-
wise be available under section 362.
Since Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (governing
injunctions and restraining orders) is applied to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings through Bankruptcy Rule 7065, discretionary action under
section 105 may be undertaken only if the movant meets the tradi-
tional conditions routinely applied to requests for preliminary in-
junctions.98 While the specific requirements may vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, this generally means that in order to obtain a
discretionary stay the movant must show: (1) probability of irrepa-
rable harm to the moving party in the absence of relief; (2) no harm
or minimal harm to the non-moving party; (3) the likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits; and (4) no harm or minimal harm to the public
interest.99 If the movant debtor fails to meet any one of these pre-
97. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837 (citations omitted). See H R REP No 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6298. See also H R REP No 95-595.
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5973 ("(Tihe bank-
ruptcy courts must have the power to enjoin actions not covered by the automatic
stay, in order that the bankruptcy case may proceed unembarrassed by multiple liti-
gation") (footnotes omitted).
98. See, e.g., In re Kawano, Inc., 27 B.R. 855, 856 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (apply-
ing four-part preliminary injunction test to determine whether injunctive relief
should issue under § 105). Cf. In re Vantage Petroleum Corp., 25 B.R. 471, 477
(Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982) (court noted that it was "unclear . . . whether the tradi-
tional test for the granting of a preliminary injunction is also applicable to [requests
for equitable relief under § 105]," but assumed this to be the case). See also, Fzn R
Civ. P. 65 and supra note 31.
99. See, e.g., In re Norwesco Dev. Corp., 68 B.R. at 131. The third precondition of
this four-part test, that the movant show "likelihood of success on the merits," has
been variously interpreted. Some courts have interpreted the requirement to mean
that the debtor must prove that it is likely that it will eventually prevail in the pro-
ceeding which is sought to be stayed. See In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
at 1189 ("The inquiry for a preliminary injunction necessarily focusses on the out-
come of a later proceeding .... ). Other jurisdictions have defined the requirement
in terms of the debtor's likelihood of success in the matter presently before the court.
See Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, supra No. 90-0228-
B, slip op. at 8 n.4 (mem.). Some commentators have also suggested that, in the con-
text of a bankruptcy case, the question under this portion of the test is not really
whether the debtor can show likelihood of a success on the merits, but whether the
debtor can prove "likelihood of a successful reorganization" if the requested stay is
granted. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 42, f 105.02, at 105-08. Clearly, it
is important for a debtor to understand which of these standards the court in its
1992]
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conditions, the discretionary stay will not issue.'00
2. The Functional Scope of Section 105
Asserting that section 105 may be invoked to issue discretionary
stays under circumstances where section 362 provides no automatic
protection, and stating in general terms the guidelines for issuance
of such a stay, gets one only a portion of the way through the analy-
sis of the courts' power under section 105. The central question still
remains: May a bankruptcy court use its equitable powers under
section 105 to stay proceedings which are brought by governmental
units to enforce environmental laws? The courts are not in accord
on this issue.
Some jurisdictions have adopted the view that section 105 may be
invoked by a debtor to stay enforcement of a government regulatory
order "to the extent that the exercise of a [governmental proceed-
ing] threatens the assets of the debtor's estate . . . ."I" These
courts often emphasize that, where state regulatory policy and bank-
ruptcy policy collide, the court must enter into a delicate balancing
of interests to determine whether or not to grant a stay of the state
regulatory proceedings.10 2 Generally, relief is granted only in ex-
traordinary circumstances when, for example, allowing the enforce-
ment action to proceed would assuredly "ruin" the reorganizing
debtor's estate,0 3 cause severe financial loss to creditors,104 result in
jurisdiction applies if the debtor is to succeed in moving for a § 105 stay.
100. See In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d at 1189-90.
101. In re Metro Transp. Co., 64 B.R. 973 (quoting SEC v. First Fin. Group, 645
F.2d 429, 440 (5th Cir. 1981)). The "threat to the estate's assets" test arose originally
under § 2(a)(15) of the prior Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 11(a)(15) (repealed 1979).
See In re Mason, 18 B.R. at 824. Since the 1978 legislation did nothing to limit the
bankruptcy courts' equity jurisdiction, cases decided under § 2(a)(15) of the prior Act
are still considered adequate authority for interpretive purposes.
102. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, Pa., 733 F.2d at 273:
Concededly, in some individual situations, the exercise of State power, even
for the protection of the public health and safety, may run so contrary to
the policy of the Bankruptcy Code that it should not be permitted. The
statute provides for such exigencies, however. The bankruptcy court, in its
discretion, may issue an appropriate injunction, even if the automatic stay
is not operative. 11 U.S.C. § 105.
(emphases added); In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. at 793 (a debtor may be
entitled to a § 105 injunction staying the enforcement of state environmental laws
where those laws unduly interfere with the bankruptcy case and such interference
outweighs the state's environmental concerns. Under such circumstances state law is
preempted by the Bankruptcy Code).
103. See In re Metro Transp. Co., 64 B.R. at 973 (state Public Utilities Commis-
sion [hereinafter PUCI action denying debtor's application for self-insurance stayed
in part because, in the absence of relief, debtor would be forced out of business); In
re Mason, 18 B.R. at 824 (state proceeding to revoke liquor license stayed because
state action would deprive debtor's estate-which in large part was comprised of a
retail liquor store-of a "substantial asset.").
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"human suffering caused by employment displacement, '" ' ' or lead
to the extinguishment of unique public services."0 6
However, all of the decisions holding that section 105 powers can
be enlisted to enjoin enforcement of state regulatory laws have one
very interesting characteristic in common; they never mention the
existence or operation of section 959(b). Under section 959(b), trust-
ees and debtors in possession are commanded to "manage and oper-
ate the property in [their] possession . . . according to the require-
ments of the valid laws of the state in which such property is
situated ... ."o Here, in title 28, we find no mention of "delicate
balancing tests" or exceptions for "extraordinary circumstances."
The provision quite simply and clearly commands debtor compli-
ance with all valid state laws.108
In contrast, the majority of jurisdictions which have held that gov-
ernment enforcement of environmental laws cannot be stayed by in-
voking the court's equitable powers under section 105 have recog-
nized and applied section 959(b).109 These courts rest their decisions
on the grounds that section 959(b) is clear and unambiguous in its
terms, that the Code was not intended to expand debtors' property
rights beyond what they would be in Chapter 11 or to give debtors a
competitive advantage in the marketplace, and that section 959(b)
serves as an express limitation on the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion which indicates in certain terms that bankruptcy courts do not
104. See In re Metro Transp. Co., 64 B.R. at 973 (state PUC action denying
debtor's application for self-insurance stayed in part because, in the absence of relief,
creditors would suffer severe financial loss); In re Mason, 18 B.R. at 824 (state pro-
ceeding to revoke debtors' liquor license stayed because, in the absence of a stay, the
debtors' attempts to pay their creditors would be "substantially frustrateldi.").
105. In re Metro Transp. Co., 64 B.R. at 973.
106. See id. at 973-74 (state PUC order denying debtor's application for self-in-
surance stayed in part because, in the absence of the requested relief, half of the
existing taxi-cab service available to the citizens of Philadelphia would be lost).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988), supra note 35.
108. At least one court which did take notice of § 959(b) did not read that provi-
sion as absolute. See In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. 786, 795-96 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1987). Rather, the court interpreted § 959(b) to be only an expression of congres-
sional intent to include the legitimate interests of the state in the equitable balancing
calculus. With regard to the operation of §§ 105 and 959(b), the court noted, "In
determining whether to enjoin an environmental . . .order under section 105, the
Bankruptcy Court should weigh the State's interests against the policies of the fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code .... Id. at 796. See supra note 33.
109. Note that § 959(b) applies only to trustees or debtors who "manage and op-
erate" a property. This section thus does not generally apply to debtors who cease
operations or liquidate under another section of the Code. See, e g, In re Scott Hous-
ing Systems, Inc., 91 B.R. 190, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988); In re Security Gas & Oil.
Inc., 70 B.R. at 796; In re Thomas Solvent Co., 44 B.R. 83. 88 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1984). But see In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1984) (since
even in Chapter 7 a trustee may be authorized to "operate or manage" a business,
there is no reason to suppose § 959(b) will be inapplicable to all liquidating debtors).
19921
MAINE LAW REVIEW
have the equitable power under section 105 to preempt enforcement
of valid state laws.110 Additionally, some courts have simply applied
the four-part test for the grant of a preliminary injunction"' and
have concluded that stays of environmental laws nearly always dis-
serve the public interest, and hence are disallowed."'
Indeed, the majority position is well-grounded in the plain mean-
ing of the Code provisions involved. First, section 959(b), as noted
above, expressly commands that trustees and debtors in possession
shall manage and operate the debtor's estate in accordance with all
valid state laws.1 13 There is no equivocation or ambiguity in this lan-
guage. Second, the terms of section 105 explicitly indicate that the
bankruptcy court's exercise of equitable jurisdiction is limited to is-
suing orders, process, and judgments which are appropriate to
"carry out the provisions of this title."'"" The section does not, as
the minority courts might indicate, empower the court to exercise its
discretion to carry out the broad and somewhat vague policies of the
Code, unless such policies are embodied by a specific provision of
title 11. 1 Since no Code provision expresses a Code "policy" which
indicates that a reorganizing debtor should be shielded from state
enforcement of environmental laws, and since section 959(b) ex-
110. See, e.g., In re Beker Indus. Corp., 57 B.R. 611, 623-24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) (there is no support for the assertion that § 105 is to be used to bring about a
change in the regulatory environment in which the debtor operates, and an ongoing
business is not to be given a competitive edge merely by virtue of its attempt to
reorganize); In re Professional Sales Corp., 56 B.R. 753, 762-64 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1985)
(allowing debtor to sidestep state enforcement of environmental laws would expand
the debtor's property rights impermissibly, would promote undesirable preferential
treatment of Chapter 11 debtors over their solvent competitors, and would be repug-
nant to the plain meaning of § 959(b)).
111. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
112. See In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1190 (5th Cir. 1986)
(dicta). Other courts have also found that debtors seeking to enjoin enforcement of
state environmental laws must necessarily fail the four-part preliminary injunction
test because the element of "irreparable harm" can never be established in such a
case. This is true because the debtor "is not injured in a legally cognizable way by
having to comply with valid state statutes not enforced with bad faith." In re Beker
Indus. Corp., 57 B.R. at 623.
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988), supra note 35.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (emphasis added), supra note 32,
115. As one commentator has noted, there are really two schools of thought on
this issue. One school recognizes that certain "policies" behind the Code are implied,
but not stated, in the statutory language and believes that § 105 gives bankruptcy
courts the authority to "fill in the gaps" left by that language. The other school con-
strues § 105 narrowly to permit its use only when necessary to carry out a specific and
explicit provision of the Code. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 42, V 105.01.
Neither school, however, would expand the use of § 105 to contradict an express
command of the statutory language like that contained in § 959(b). See, e.g., Saravia
v. 1736 18th St.. N.W., Ltd. Partnership, 844 F.2d 823, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (debtor
had to comply with state housing regulations where there was no direct conflict be-
tween the actions required by state law and any particular provision of the Code).
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pressly commands debtor compliance with such laws, section 105
may not be invoked to override their enforcement. Further, propo-
nents of this school of thought cite the express language contained
in subsection 362(b), which in part permits governmental units to
proceed with enforcement actions so long as such enforcement ac-
tion is not initiated to procure a money judgment."10 This language,
it is argued, is evidence that where Congress wished to empower the
bankruptcy court to stay enforcement of state regulatory laws, it ex-
pressly conferred such power. If the state action does not fit within
an explicit exemption, it should not be stayed by equitable means in
contradiction of Congress' clear intent."3 7
The legislative history behind sections 105 and 362 also supports
the majority interpretation. Both the Senate and House reports in-
dicate that section 362 is intended to preempt state law: "[Slection
[362 is] intended to be an express waiver of sovereign immunity of
the Federal Government, and an assertion of the bankruptcy power
over State governments under the supremacy clause notwithstand-
ing a State's sovereign immunity."" The legislative history under-
lying section 105 contains no similar language. In the absence of a
clear expression of congressional intent to impart preemptive powers
to a federal provision, such intent should not be lightly inferred."1 9
The majority position also finds support in some United States
Supreme Court decisions. In Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers, 20 the Supreme Court held that "whatever equitable powers
remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised
within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." In short, this means
that the court's equitable powers under section 105 cannot be in-
voked in a manner which is inconsistent with the statutory language
and legislative history of the Code. This would seem to indicate that
since an injunction of state enforcement of valid environmental laws
would operate to nullify the explicit commands of section 959(b),
bankruptcy courts cannot claim to possess such power.' Indeed,
116. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1989), supra note 48.
117. See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494, 509 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[When Congress Was so concerned
[about enforcement of state environmental regulations] it expressed itself clearly,
specifically exempting some environmental injunctions from the automatic stay provi-
sions of section 362 of the Code. ... ) (citations omitted).
118. . REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837; H.R. REP No. 95-595, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. 342 (1978). re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6299 (emphasis added).
119. See infra note 128.
120. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
121. Id. at 206.
122. While Ahlers did not expressly address the operation of § 105. courts have
employed the same rationale expressed in Ahlers and have held that the bankruptcy
court's equitable discretion under § 105 is limited and cannot be used in a manner
inconsistent with other Code provisions. See In re Plaza de Diego Shopping Ctr.. Inc..
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the Court has expressly stated, without specifically addressing the
interaction of sections 105 and 959(b), that "we do not question that
anyone in possession of [an abandoned] site . . . must comply with
the environmental laws of the State. . .. Plainly, [a] person or firm
may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, or re-
fuse to remove the source of such conditions."'
23
Still, the minority position is not entirely without merit. First,
though the Supreme Court has never conclusively evaluated the ef-
fect of section 959(b) in the context of state environmental law en-
forcement, 124 it is clear that section 959(b) is not an omnipotent pro-
vision. A debtor need not, for instance, comply with valid state laws
which are enforced merely to protect a state's pecuniary interests or
to collect a money judgment under section 362. Nor is the bankrupt
bound to abide by state laws which are contrary to the provisions of
the Code, since under preemption analysis the Code must prevail
over contradictory state legislation. 125 Since it is clear that Congress
did not literally intend to require debtors to comply with all valid
state laws,126 a persuasive argument can be made that it is proper
from a policy standpoint to engage in a discretionary "balancing
test" to determine, on a case-by-case basis, when and if a debtor
should be required to abide by a particular state law, particularly
where denying discretionary relief will do great harm to the debtor's
estate, and hence frustrate the central spirit of the Code. 27
911 F.2d 820, 830-31 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th
Cir. 1986); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 917 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson v.
First Nat'l Bank of Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
123. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1984).
124. In Ahlers, the Court spoke in general terms about the scope of the bank-
ruptcy court's equitable powers. While it did state that these powers cannot be exer-
cised in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Code, it did not address the
effect of provisions promulgated under other titles, such as 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). Simi-
larly, in Kovacs, the Court did not address the scope or applicability of § 959(b)
directly, but only referred to that section as persuasive authority indicating that Con-
gress did not intend the Code to override all state environmental laws.
125. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (acts of state legisla-
tures which interfere with or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made pursuant to
the Constitution, are invalid under the Supremacy Clause). See also In re Torwico
Elects., Inc., 131 B.R. 561, 575 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (state legislation which purports
to limit the effect of bankruptcy on environmental clean-up obligations, or to create
additional obligations for filing debtors, is void under the Supremacy Clause).
126. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.
494, 505 (1986). The Court in Midlantic noted that § 959(b) provided evidence that
"Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws." Id.
(emphasis added). Implicit in this assertion is that Congress may have intended to
preempt some state laws.
127. Viewing the Code from this angle, §§ 362(a) and (b) provide express exemp-
tions from debtor compliance with state law under § 959(b). These two subsections
operate to establish the fact that Congress did not intend § 959(b) to control in every
case. Having established the quasi-controlling nature of § 959(b), it is not entirely
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Second, the language of section 959(a) has often been ignored by
majority courts addressing the interaction of sections 105 and
959(b). The latter section explicitly provides that although trustees,
receivers, and managers of a debtor's property may be sued, the ac-
tions against them "shall be subject to the general equity power of
such court so far as the same may be necessary to the ends of justice
.... 128 When read in conjunction with subpart (b), 20 this section
seems to indicate that, while a debtor in possession may be sued
under valid state laws, suits brought in furtherance of those laws are
still subject to the equity powers of the presiding court. Certainly
among those equitable powers is the authority to grant preliminary
injunctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.
Indeed, there appears to have been at least a little congressional
confusion over the scope and effect of section 105. In an appendix to
the House report on the 1978 Act, one commentator notes that the
1978 law would change the operation of the automatic stay to cor-
rect misinterpretations of the old automatic stay provision which
had operated in some cases to enjoin state enforcement of environ-
mental and consumer fraud laws. 10 The new stay provision, the
commentator explained, was structured explicitly to allow states to
enforce their regulatory powers under the exceptions outlined in sec-
tion 362(b). This type of open-ended authorization to enforce state
regulatory laws was acceptable, the author noted, because "It]he
bankruptcy court has ample additional power [under section 105] to
prevent damage to the bankrupt estate by such actions on a case-by-
case basis."1'' Thus, the power of the bankruptcy court to enjoin
state enforcement actions permitted under section 362, in this in-
stance at least, was presumed, with no mention of the existence or
operation of section 959(b).
However viable such arguments may be, the fact remains that the
great weight of authority leans heavily toward disallowing the equi-
illogical to conclude that Congress may have intended § 105 to act as a further "open
exemption" from compliance with valid state laws in cases where the debtor can
prove the elements of the four-part preliminary injunction test. See supra text ac-
companying notes 95-97.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1989) provides, in full:
Trustees, receivers or managers of any property, including debtors in pos-
session, may be sued, without leave of the court appointing them, with re-
spect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected
with such property. Such actions shall be subject to the general equity
power of such court so far as the same may be necessary to the ends of
justice, but this shall not deprive a litigant of his right to trial by jury.
129. For the text of this provision, see supra note 35.
130. HEARINGS ON H.R. 31 AND H R 32 BEFORE THE SUBCOMNM ON CIVIL AND CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE House COMM ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 166, 174-75, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6127, 6135 (statement of
David H. Williams, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission) (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 6135.
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table stay of state environmental law enforcement. Language from
the Supreme Court and from nearly every jurisdiction which has ad-
dressed this issue in the context of section 959(b) indicates that, ab-
sent very specific commands to the contrary, section 105 will not be
read to preempt enforcement of state legislation designed to protect
health and safety. While this may reflect a very conservative ap-
proach to the interpretation of the bankruptcy court's equitable
power under section 105, it is certainly an approach which is conso-
nant with established rules of preemption analysis.13
III. WILNER WOOD PRODUCTS Co. REVISITED
In Wilner Wood, both the bankruptcy court 33 and the United
States District Court134 implicitly agreed on one issue: the automatic
stay of section 362 was not applicable to the instant case. This con-
clusion seems entirely rational given that: (1) the State was seeking
to enforce the environmental regulation pursuant to protecting the
health, safety, and general welfare of the public; 30 (2) the State was
not seeking simply to protect its pecuniary interest in the estate; 30
and (3) the State was not attempting to enforce a judgment which
was either in form or substance a "money judgment."' 37 Perhaps the
debtor could have argued that the State's denial of the emissions
license was an "act to obtain property of the estate" under sections
362(a)(3) and 541, but this issue was apparently not raised in the
first proceeding and, even if it had been, the debtor's likelihood of
success in employing such an argument would have been minimal
given the current state of the law.'
The real point of contention between the two decisions was
whether federal courts have the equitable power under section 105
132. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.
494, 501 (1986) ("If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption
from nonbankruptcy law, 'the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be
collected or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering
the estate of the bankrupt.' ") (citation omitted); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) (preemption must be explicit or compelled due
to an unavoidable conflict between the state law and the federal law); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (consideration of whether a state provision violates the
Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to
displace state law); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942) (where the traditional police power of the state is deemed
to be withdrawn by Congress in bankruptcy legislation, evidence of that withdrawal
in fit language should be found within the act).
133. See Wilner Wood I, supra note 28; Wilner Wood II, supra note 26.
134. See Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, No. 90-
0228-B (D. Me. May 10, 1991) (mem.).
135. See discussion supra part II.A.1.
136. Id.
137. See supra part II.A.2.
138. See supra part II.A.3.
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to issue a discretionary stay of the state action despite the inappli-
cability of the section 362 automatic stay. While it has been well
established that under some circumstances a section 105 stay may
issue where section 362 is inapplicable, 3 a closer look at both the
bankruptcy and district courts' decisions in Wilner Wood is instruc-
tive on a narrower issue, namely, whether a federal bankruptcy
court has the equitable authority to enjoin a state's enforcement of
state environmental laws to protect the interests of debtors and
creditors.
The federal bankruptcy court's opinion, which determined that
section 105 did operate to empower the court to enjoin enforcement
of state environmental actions, was grounded primarily in a misin-
terpretation of In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc. "0 In Security Gas &
Oil, the State of West Virginia brought an enforcement action to
compel the debtor to reclaim certain abandoned oil and gas wells
pursuant to state law. The debtor sought refuge from the State, and
in bankruptcy court prayed for an injunction under section 105 to
foreclose further efforts by the State to terminate the debtor's oper-
ations or to force reclamation of the abandoned wells. After a thor-
ough review of the case law in this area, the court concluded:
[Aln environmental clean-up order should not be enjoined under
section 105 where that order is designed to bring a debtor's contin-
uing operations into compliance with state law. A bankruptcy
debtor operating a business avails itself of the protections of state
law as much as any other business, and should be subject to the
relevant burdens state law imposes. Section 959(b) of the Judicial
Code requires a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession to op-
erate any continuing business in conformity with applicable state
laws.14
Having asserted that this is the law for debtors-in-possession who
are operating a continuing business on the property subject to the
environmental order, the court went on to note that "[a) more diffi-
cult question arises where the debtor continues to operate a busi-
ness, but does not operate on the property subject to the clean-up
order or operates a line of business wholly unrelated to the prop-
erty to be cleaned up."'"2 The court then laid out a nine-part "equi-
table balancing test" to be applied only under just such
circumstances.'4 3
The Security Gas & Oil test was thus inapplicable to the facts of
Wilner Wood. The Security Gas & Oil court never intended its ap-
plication to extend to debtors who, like Wilner Wood, are continuing
139. See supra part II.B.1.
140. 70 B.R. 786 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). See Wilner Wood 1. supra note 28.
141. In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. at 796.
142. Id. (emphases added).
143. Id. at 796-97. See supra note 33.
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operations on the very site subject to environmental enforcement.
Moreover, in addition to misapplying Security Gas & Oil, the bank-
ruptcy court in Wilner Wood never acknowledged section 959(b) or
cited a case for the proposition that injunctive relief under section
105 may be granted to override state laws in the face of that provi-
sion."" In short, the court appears to have missed the issue and ar-
rived at the "wrong" conclusion. 145
On appeal the United States District Court picked up the ball the
bankruptcy court had dropped. The district court recognized section
959(b) as a controlling provision and decided, as have the majority
of courts in this arena,1 41 that its express command could not be
overridden by the bankruptcy court's general equity powers under
section 105. The court did recognize the minority view in a foot-
note, ' 47 but found the majority view to consist of the "better-rea-
soned" cases without fully describing why the court thought this was
so.' 48 Perhaps the reason is to be found near the end of that opinion.
In concluding that section 959(b) controlled in this case, the court
avoided having to address the much more difficult issue of "whether
the Constitution permits a bankruptcy court to issue an injunction
against the State without the State's consent.' 49
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal power of a federal bankruptcy court to enjoin enforce-
ment of state environmental laws is largely a matter of settled law.
Under the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, state
enforcement of environmental laws must be permitted to proceed
unless (1) the State is acting solely to protect its pecuniary interest
in the debtor's estate,' 50 (2) the State is acting to enforce against the
debtor what is in form or substance a money judgment,' 5 ' or (3) the
State is acting to obtain property of the bankrupt's estate.'5 2
As a practical matter, state enforcement of environmental regula-
tions will always pass the "pecuniary interest" test since such en-
forcement, while perhaps pecuniary in part, always serves some le-
gitimate public purpose such as deterrence or protection of health,
144. The bankruptcy court neglected to do this despite the fact that the court in
Security Gas & Oil did reference § 959(b) in its decision. Id. at 796.
145. Or at the very least, the bankruptcy court reached a conclusion that has been
rejected by the majority of courts addressing this issue. See supra text accompanying
note 128.
146. See supra text accompanying note 128.
147. Wilner Wood Prods. Co. v. Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection, No. 90-0228-B,
slip op. at 6 n.3 (D. Me. May 10, 1991) (mem.).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 8.
150. See discussion supra part II.A.1.
151. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
152. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
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safety, or general welfare.153 As to the second exception, states will
be permitted to bring and enforce actions which seek to compel per-
formance calculated to prevent future public harm, but not to bring
suit to recover a sum certain in actions that sound in restitution or
compensation for past damages.1 5' Finally, under the last exception,
the minority view indicates that a federal court may stay the revoca-
tion of certain state-issued environmental licenses, permits, or other
privileges.155
The more difficult questions arise in the context of the bank-
ruptcy court's exercise of its equitable authority to enjoin enforce-
ment of state environmental laws under section 105. The majority
view recognizes that the plain language of section 959(b), the legisla-
tive history behind sections 362 and 105, and well-established judi-
cial rules relating to federal preemption of state law operate to fore-
close the exercise of such broad equitable authority.' The minority
view, on the other hand, argues that Congress must have intended to
grant bankruptcy courts the power to enjoin enforcement of state
laws where such enforcement would run contrary to the broad poli-
cies of debtor and creditor protection which underlie the current
Code.15 7 While we may never know how Congress intended for sec-
tion 105 to operate in the context of state environmental law en-
forcement, or even if it contemplated the friction that was to arise
from the interaction of these two bodies of law, " 8 there is a very
strong policy argument to be made for the majority position.
The middle ground between bankruptcy and environmental law
should be established such that the operation of the bankruptcy
court's legal and equitable staying powers are in accord with our
fundamental democratic principles of fairness in the marketplace
and with our undoubted interest in maintaining a high quality of life
through environmental protection. Enforcing the majority view of
the courts' equitable powers under section 105 serves both of these
ends by striking a principled compromise.
By not allowing section 105 to be invoked to stay enforcement of
state environmental statutes which seek to remedy present or im-
pending harms, the majority position successfully prevents exacer-
bation of existing environmental hazards and keeps the Code from
becoming an absolute "shield" for environmental wrongdoers. Ac-
tions brought by governmental creditors seeking redress for past en-
153. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
154. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
155. See discussion supra part II.A.3.
156. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
157. See supra notes 98-103, 120-27, and accompanying text.
158. See Smith, supra note 7, § 1.01, at 1-3 (concluding that the conflict between
bankruptcy and environmental law was "dimly foreseen by the drafters of the 11978
Act]").
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vironmental harms which no longer exist due to government clean-
up programs'a9 are stayed and dealt with as are the claims of any
other creditor, thereby eliminating any preferential treatment to-
ward governmental creditors and simultaneously protecting the in-
terests of non-governmental creditors. Relieving debtors of the duty
to comply with environmental statutes which sound in compensation
also provides the debtor with some breathing space and enhances its
opportunity to successfully rehabilitate its operation and perhaps,
eventually, to meet its responsibility with regard to environmental
legislation. At the same time, the majority's position fosters funda-
mental fairness in the marketplace by requiring reorganizing debtors
to operate prospectively in the same regulatory environment as its
competitors, and thus prevents bankruptcy from becoming an in-
strument of unfair competition.
In the final analysis, the result of the implemented policy is all
that really matters. A strained reading of statutory language or leg-
islative history, or an over-reliance on a handful of nonrepresenta-
tive decisions may lend some technical weight to the minority view
of the operation of section 105, but the result of such an interpreta-
tion is largely unacceptable. Allowing bankruptcy courts to enjoin
enforcement of state environmental laws might indeed help some
debtors to get back on their feet and become environmentally re-
sponsible operators. But on the whole, such a policy would severely
handicap efforts to maintain environmental quality-a concern of
primary importance in today's society-and would make bankruptcy
a welcome haven indeed for the polluter and the poorly-managed.
David A. Brenningmeyer
159. See, e.g., the Superfund provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Re.
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1989).
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